A growing literature highlights the importance of leader image as a determinant of voting in contemporary democracies, as a force now paralleling the explanatory power of traditional structural and ideological factors affecting voting choice. Yet the actual effect of leaders in the citizen's vote calculus remains uncertain because of the potential reciprocal causation between leader evaluation and other vote determinants. Thus, the extent to which voters' appreciation of leaders depends on their personality traits or on their policies, and how these forces variously influence the vote, is difficult to assess. To cope with this endogeneity problem we rely on instrumental variable estimation and two-stage regression analysis. We are able to show that in the highly polarized 2006 Italian legislative elections, the net direct effect of leaders on voting choice was actually weaker than that exerted by issue preferences.
Political science research on the role that party leaders play in the citizen's calculus of voting has increased in recent years. Scholars have documented increasing leader visibility and influence in the electoral campaigns (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) , in the parties (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000) and in the executive branch of parliamentary democracies (Karvonen, 2010) . Such presidentialization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005) , which assigns leaders centre stage, also impacts directly on mass political behavior, with political leaders becoming more important cues (McAllister, 2007; Aarts et al., 2011; Bittner, 2011; Garzia, 2011) . Moreover, as the literature on valence politics argues (Stokes, 1992; Clarke et al., 2004; 2009; Bellucci, 2006) leader likeability contributes to the popular evaluation of their party which, with partisanship and economic considerations (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007) , strongly orient voter choice.
Yet research on the personalization of politics has not reached a consensus on the leader effect, even concerning the impact from leaders' images on voting itself. Prevailing opinion on such an effect in parliamentary democracies has been rather skeptical (King, 2002a; Curtice and Holberg, 2005; Karvonen, 2010) .
Indeed, a recent assessment of party leader effects in democratic elections finds that "party effects are clearly stronger than party leader effects" (Holberg and Oscarson, 2011: 39) .
Therefore, uncertainty persists regarding the relevance of leader effects, with respect to their absolute and relative impact. Here we confront this issue, maintaining that much uncertainty about the impact of leaders comes from the way the leader effect is conceptualized and measured. It has been rightly argued that a reciprocal relationship exists between voters' evaluation of leaders and their evaluation of the parties: "People tend to like leaders of parties they like and since most people tend to vote for parties they like, we have a problem" (Holberg and Oscarson, 2011: 37) . Hence the difficulty in assessing leader effects, which requires one to "disentangl[e] the impact of leaders from that of the parties they lead" (Gidengil and Blais, 2007: 14) . Curtice and Holberg (2005: 236 ) go on to observe that "the power of the leaders lies in their ability to lead and mould their party rather than their ability to appeal to voters independently of their party." Thus, the suggestion is that the electoral effect of leaders lies not only in their personal appeal, but as well in their capacity to shape the party's offer to voters in terms of political and ideological stances.
In this paper, we begin with the notion that causality between voters' assessment of party issues and party leaders is reciprocal, with X influencing Y and Y influencing X (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Macdonald et al., 1998) . Such reciprocal causation generates serious difficulties when the usual regression estimation techniques are applied, namely the problem of simultaneous equation bias. Here we cope with this endogeneity problem by using panel data and instrumental variables estimation. Through careful application of structural equation methods, in the context of real change over time, we are able to explain the extent to which voters' support for leaders depends on their parties' policies and vice-versa, and how these forces influence the vote.
We employ data from the 2006 Italian parliamentary election, for it allows an ideal natural experiment to test the hypothesis of a leader effect on voting.
After the 1994 collapse of traditional cleavage parties, a new catch-all party system emerged. Voters were largely orphaned from previous partisanships, and faced a main political contender, Silvio Berlusconi, founder of Italy's largest party, Forza Italia, and owner of a near-monopoly private TV network. The launch of his new personal party (Calise, 2000) , based on a strong, controversial usage of political marketing and television, brought about greater visibility of political leaders (Mazzoleni, 1996; Calise, 2005) . In fact, voting research has uncovered an unprecedented, strong leader image effect, in particular from Berlusconi, on vote choice (Sani, 2002 The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we discuss the ways leaders may influence vote choice and briefly review previous research. Then, variables, definitions and operational strategies are presented. Finally, the findings of the analysis are discussed and assessed. As shall be seen, while both leaders and issues are important, the latter are much more so than previously thought.
Leaders and issues as determinants of vote choice: A review
Spatial models of party competition assume that voting is best explained by the proximity of voters to party policy positions, along a continuum of alternatives (Downs, 1957) . In contrast, the existing literature on the personalization of politics assigns crucial importance to the likeability of leaders perceived to be appealing or competent (McAllister, 2007; Clarke et al., 2009 ). Both these perspectives assume a reasoning voter, although the former relies on a notion of rational calculus while the latter rests on heuristic reasoning. Focusing on the voters' cognitive process, there seems to be an inherent reciprocal causation between voters' perception of parties' policy outlook and the image of their leaders. Voters' issue preferences may shape the image of the party leader, just as the likeability of the leaders may affect the voters' perceptions of parties' policy stances. Miller and Shanks (1996: 207) frame this cognitive process in terms of "persuasion" effects, according to which voters adjust their own policy preferences to match the position of the party they have already chosen because of other factors. Thus, a party can be perceived closer to a voter's position because of the appeal of the party's leader. This may produce, as Macdonald et al. (1998) argue, a "rationalization" effect which contaminates voters' evaluation of a party's issue position. Voters may be induced to locate a party closer to themselves on issues because they like the party for other reasons. In this case "it is wrong to claim that issue proximity causes positive evaluation. In fact, the reverse is true: proximity follows from prior affect" (Macdonald et al., 1998: 672) . Conversely, a party's position on the issues may push voters to evaluate that party's leader more favorably.
From a different perspective, King's (2002b) Less controversial is the notion of the direct effect of leaders. Politicians can gain (or lose) votes due to the way in which their personality profile is perceived by voters, independently of the image of the party they lead. Leaders' image -based on personality and individual characteristics -defines their overall appeal to voters (Miller et al., 1986) . Previous research has shown that voters develop a mental image of political leaders as persons on the basis of a restricted number of categories namely, competence, leadership, honesty, and empathy (Kinder, 1986; Funk, 1999; McGraw, 2003) . The perceived personality traits of political leaders can also affect directly voters' choices (Bean and Mughan, 1989; Bean, 1993; Ohr & Oscarsson, 2011) .
How can we disentangle the simultaneous effects of issue preferences and leader likeability on voting? Previous research on parliamentary democracies has mainly assessed the impact of leaders on voting choice by adopting a research design based on an improved-prediction strategy. That is, the method of entering sequentially variables according to the supposed causal impact of voting determinants, from long-term to short-term ones. Typically, entering the leader variable last produces a positive assessment of the impact of leader image on voting (King, 2002a) . This however does not solve the inherent endogenity between our variables of interest. Bartle and Crewe (2002) clearly acknowledge it, making the strong assumption "that, while party and leadership images are caused by the same variables, they do not in turn 'cause' each other". They conclude that "…the precise relationship between leadership and party images cannot be fully determined given the limited data available…Our bloc recursive models assume that party and leader images are located at the same stage within our model" (Bartle and Crewe, 2002: 80-81 We begin with an assessment of the direct electoral effect of leaders and issues on vote choice, offering a parsimonious model where vote is a function of leaders' synoptic evaluation (Leaders) and voters' coalition utilities (Issues), plus a set of standard controls that describe respondents' placement in the social structure, thusly:
(Eq. 1) Vote t = Leaders t + Issues t + Age + Gender + Education + SocialClass + ChurchAttendance + E It is worth explaining the measurement of Leaders and Issues in some detail, as they will serve throughout the paper. Leaders is a synoptic evaluation of the two leaders based on the standard thermometer question probing, on a 1-10 scale, voters' likability of the leaders. Prodi's score has been subtracted from Berlusconi' s , and re-scaled 0-1 so that the lowest value of 0 means the greatest support for Prodi and the smallest for Berlusconi, and 1 means the opposite. 4 In order to measure Issues, we operationalize party (coalition) attractiveness according to voters' issue preferences. Relying on a Downsian approach, we have calculated the voters' coalition utilities by summing the votercoalition distance over three issues that were prominent in the campaign.
Respondents were asked to place both coalitions as well as themselves on a 7-point scale for the following: taxation, immigration, worker rights. 5 The empirical variable Issues has been computed in three steps: (1) Below follows a summary of these measures, and the other measures for this model in Eq.1 (descriptive statistics on these and other manuscript variables are available in the Appendix).
Vote is coded 0 for centre-left and 1 for centre-right 6 ;
Leaders is a synoptic evaluation of the two leaders, with a range from 0, greatest support for Prodi, to 1, greatest support for Berlusconi;
Issues is a synoptic coalition utility, ranging from 0, maximum proximity to the centre-left coalition, to 1, maximum proximity to the centre-right
Age, is expressed in years;
Gender is coded 0 for male and 1 for female;
Education has four categories, from elementary to university degree;
SocialClass has 5 categories (workers, agricultural and urban self-employment, middle class, upper middle class) 7 ;
ChurchAttendance has five categories, from 'never' to 'daily/weekly' attendance; t = measured in the post-election wave.
E is the error term.
In Table 1 (Kinder, 1986) . Our first determinants of Leaders will then be the two leaders' traits indices. These indices are built from the respondents' evaluation of the extent (4 categories from not at all -coded 1 -to very much -coded 4) to which each of the two coalition leaders possesses eight personal characteristics. 8 ProdiTraits and BerlusconiTraits are then computed as additive scores over the eight traits, with values ranging from 8 to 32. 9 These traits are held to be effectively exogenous to leadership, because they are enduring personality characteristics measured prior in time, and because they leave about half the variance in leadership unaccounted for (i.e., respectively, the R-squared are .46 and .56), further suggesting that the voters became better acquainted with the leaders during the campaign. Besides leader traits, we add a StrongLeader variable, captured by agree-disagree answers to the statement "Italy needs a strong leader". This orientation relates to basic political attitudesgeneralized distrust of politics and representative democracy -and is increasingly common as this number of politically disengaged voters is on the rise (Baldassarri, 2005) . Lastly, we include as a determinant of leader likability the voters' coalition utilities, our Issues variable measured in the pre-election wave of the survey. StrongLeader has a range from 1 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree);
LeftRight is voter self-positioning on the 1-10 Left-Right continuum;
UnemploymentSalience and CriminalitySalience are perception of importance of problems on a scale from 1 (nor at all important) to 7 (very much important); t = measured in the post-election wave;
t-1 = measured in the pre-election wave;
The equations are estimated (ordinary least squares -OLS) in Table 2 (Panel A1 and Panel B1). The model fits appear satisfactory, with adjusted Rsquared of .61 and .48, respectively. These strong numbers are encouraging, given that the independent variables, mirroring to some extent causality in real time, are measured four months before the dependent variables. Furthermore, all the independent variables but one are highly statistically significant and rightly signed.
The coefficients of special concern are those of the Issues and Leaders variables in the two equations. They suggest, on their face, that the effect of Issues on Leaders well exceeds the effect of Leaders on Issues, with b Issues = .44, and b Leaders = .30.
However, we cannot uncritically accept such a conclusion since simultaneous equation bias affects the system, throwing these OLS estimates into question.
[
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Exogenizing the effects of leaders on issues and vice-versa: Instrumental variables estimation
This OLS bias stems from the correlation of the ordinary independent variables, Leaders (L) and Issues (I), respectively, with the equation error term (Wood and Park, 2004) . Such correlation is inevitable, given the reciprocal causal link between the two. The practical solution to this problem is to replace variables L and I with proxies that will not be correlated with the error. These proxies, or instrumental variables, labeled L' and I', are constructed from available exogenous variables.
Note that only exogenous variables should be used for this purpose, because they are uncorrelated with the error terms, and hence will render the instrumental variable likewise uncorrelated. 11
To build the instruments, it is essential that the variables selected for the task truly are exogenous. If that criterion is not met, the procedure will not overcome the bias problem. To hold exogenous status, these variables must be caused by forces outside the system of equations, and must not be correlated with the model error terms (on these points, consult the valuable discussion in Woolridge, 2006: 525-540) . Most measures of socioeconomic status conform to this standard, tending to be fixed characteristics the respondent brings to the voting booth. Also, overarching, basic attitudes, e.g., political interest or attitudes toward democracy, can achieve exogenous rank.
With these guidelines in mind, we came up with a set of variables we believe meet rather strict exogeneity conditions. First, note that they are from the pre-election wave, which ensures they meet the important causal criterion of occurring prior in time. Here is the list of available SES variables considered: age, gender, education, social class, church attendance. And, here is the list of basic attitudes considered: interest in politics, exposure to TV news from state/private, and retrospective economic evaluation. With these, we construct instruments I' and L'. However, we cannot use them all to render each instrument, because an insurmountable collinearity problem would ensue. Therefore, they were systematically separated into two groups, to guarantee their adequate statistical independence and, at the same time, maximize their predictive power as a proxy. 12
The two sets of exogenous variables, respectively, correlate well with the endogenous Leaders variable (R= .41) and the endogenous Issues variable (R = .42).
Thus, we have confidence in the quality of the two instruments, whose inter- Table 1 ) the Leaders impact was almost twice that of Issues, here the reverse seems true. The statistical coefficient of Issues (b Issues-hat = 9.8) is in fact almost two times larger than that of Leaders (b Leaders-hat = 5.5).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The net effect of these exogenized Leaders and Issues variables on the vote is graphically summarized in Figure 1 , which shows the predicted probability of centre-right vote according to the respondent's coalition utilities and evaluation of leaders' likeability, with all other variables in the model set at their mean value.
The message conveyed is rather unequivocal. If endogeneity is taken into account, then the effect of Issues dominates that of Leaders -this being especially the case for voters with high levels of closeness to the issues.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Robustness tests
In order to check the robustness of these instrumental variable findings, we have carried out several exercises. First, we replicated the analysis, attempting to take account of campaign effects. While the pre/post-election design commends itself in terms of stronger causal inference, a possible flaw could arise from the fact that we have not therefore taken into account the impact of the electoral campaign (taking place from February to April). As discussed in the introduction, this campaign was intense and could have likely affected the voters' perception of both leaders' images and party policy positions. Actually, while among voters with a centre-right or a centre-left vote propensity before the elections Berlusconi and Prodi's ratings remained rather stable during the campaign, among undecided voters we observe a clear change. For those undecided who then voted for centreleft, Prodi's evaluation increased from 5.6 to 6.7; likewise, for those undecided who then voted centre-right, Berlusconi's evaluation rose from 5.4 to 6.8 (Bellucci et al., 2010) .
To take into account the possibility of this campaign influence, we exogenized Leaders and Issues as before but using exogenous variables from the second wave, after the election campaign. This allows any effect from the campaign to be fully absorbed in the voters' calculations. The results of this experimental analysis appear in Table 3 (Panel B). The picture remains little changed, with issue effects still dominating leader effects (8.6/6.3). Again, voters appear driven more by parties' policy stances than by leaders' images. 15
The second exercise was to perform jackknife tests, to examine the stability of the instruments. After all, they are built from a selection of exogenous variables, and that selection might appear arbitrary to some. Thus, we excluded one exogenous variable at a time from the construction of the instrument, and reestimated Eqs. 2 and 3, respectively, with these new instruments. We observe that the model adjusted R-squared barely budges; for Leaders, it goes from .40-.41, for
Issues from .55-.56. Thus, the performance of the second-stage, instrumented models does not appear to rest on the presence or absence of a particular variable.
The third, and final, exercise concerns the presence of media exposure and retrospective economics as exogenous variables, in the construction of the instruments. Since one of these variables serves for the Leaders instrument, and the other serves for the Issues instrument, it might be argued that this service is arbitrary. Therefore, as a test, we simply switched their roles, so instrumenting
Leaders with retrospective economics, and Issues with media exposure (recall that both could not be included, because of collinearity). The results are confirmatory. In sum, from these foregoing exercises, we conclude that the instrumental variables results of Tables 2 and 3 , with respect to the impact of Issues and Leaders, are robust.
Conclusions
The role of political leaders has grown in contemporary democracies, and their electoral appeal is assumed to have increased. Yet, voting behavior research has not reached a consensus on the actual contours of such a leader effect, mainly due Against this backdrop, our findings do not deny a leader effect on voting.
However, the analysis of reciprocal effects has shown that the image of the leaders contributes to the voters' perception of parties' utilities significantly less than the extent to which issues proximity causes voters' perception of the leader image.
Therefore, when jointly employed to explain vote choice, party utilities direct contribution exceeds that of the leaders' image. This is true even in a political contest -like Italy's Second Republic -where the personalization of politics has apparently come dangerously close to a populist democracy. Our findings are therefore reassuring: our conclusion is that, in the voters' eyes, leaders represent their parties and their policies more than they represent themselves. 4 Prodi reports a somewhat higher mean thermometer score (4.93) as compared to Berlusconi (4.53). In addition, popular evaluations of the latter appear more polarized (st.
dev. = 3.1) than is the case with Prodi (st. dev. = 2.6).
5 The format of the questions reads as follows: (A) Some people say that taxes need to be reduced even through it might lead to a reduction in public services. Others say that public services need to be extended even through it might lead to more taxes. The Leaders instrument, L,' was constructed from the following: age, gender, education, social class, interest in politics, exposure to TV news. Full estimation procedure is available from the authors upon request.
13 As Kmenta (1997: 365) notes, the Hausman test "can be used whenever we can implement an instrumental variables estimation procedure". To illustrate, the test examines whether the residual, U (after predicting endogenous independent variable Y2 from the selected instrumental variables) is a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable, Y1, when added to the specification of the original equation [e.g., Y1 = a + bY2 + cU + e]. Applying the Hausman test to the equations of Table 2 , we find the residual coefficient for the Leaders equation does not achieve conventional statistical significance (prob. F = .30). Similarly, the residual coefficient for the Issues equation does not achieve conventional statistical significance (prob. F = .98). As well, it is worth noting that the same test, when applied to the vote equation of Table 3 , likewise fails to achieve conventional statistical significance (prob. F = .32). Thus, we cannot in any of these cases reject the null. We conclude that the instruments, as constructed, meet the necessary assumption of no correlation with the error term. Note: ***p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; + p < .10 Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
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